Wick's theorem for q-deformed boson operators

In this paper combinatorial aspects of normal ordering arbitrary words in the creation and annihilation operators of the q-deformed boson are discussed. In particular, it is shown how by introducing appropriate q-weights for the associated ``Feynman diagrams'' the normally ordered form of a general expression in the creation and annihilation operators can be written as a sum over all q-weighted Feynman diagrams, representing Wick's theorem in the present context.Comment: 9 page

On Linear Congestion Games with Altruistic Social Context

We study the issues of existence and inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria in linear congestion games with altruistic social context, in the spirit of the model recently proposed by de Keijzer {\em et al.} \cite{DSAB13}. In such a framework, given a real matrix $\Gamma=(\gamma_{ij})$ specifying a particular social context, each player $i$ aims at optimizing a linear combination of the payoffs of all the players in the game, where, for each player $j$, the multiplicative coefficient is given by the value $\gamma_{ij}$. We give a broad characterization of the social contexts for which pure Nash equilibria are always guaranteed to exist and provide tight or almost tight bounds on their prices of anarchy and stability. In some of the considered cases, our achievements either improve or extend results previously known in the literature

One-sided Cauchy-Stieltjes Kernel Families

This paper continues the study of a kernel family which uses the Cauchy-Stieltjes kernel in place of the celebrated exponential kernel of the exponential families theory. We extend the theory to cover generating measures with support that is unbounded on one side. We illustrate the need for such an extension by showing that cubic pseudo-variance functions correspond to free-infinitely divisible laws without the first moment. We also determine the domain of means, advancing the understanding of Cauchy-Stieltjes kernel families also for compactly supported generating measures

Network Creation Games: Think Global - Act Local

We investigate a non-cooperative game-theoretic model for the formation of communication networks by selfish agents. Each agent aims for a central position at minimum cost for creating edges. In particular, the general model (Fabrikant et al., PODC'03) became popular for studying the structure of the Internet or social networks. Despite its significance, locality in this game was first studied only recently (Bil\`o et al., SPAA'14), where a worst case locality model was presented, which came with a high efficiency loss in terms of quality of equilibria. Our main contribution is a new and more optimistic view on locality: agents are limited in their knowledge and actions to their local view ranges, but can probe different strategies and finally choose the best. We study the influence of our locality notion on the hardness of computing best responses, convergence to equilibria, and quality of equilibria. Moreover, we compare the strength of local versus non-local strategy-changes. Our results address the gap between the original model and the worst case locality variant. On the bright side, our efficiency results are in line with observations from the original model, yet we have a non-constant lower bound on the price of anarchy.Comment: An extended abstract of this paper has been accepted for publication in the proceedings of the 40th International Conference on Mathematical Foundations on Computer Scienc

The Firefighter Problem: A Structural Analysis

We consider the complexity of the firefighter problem where b>=1 firefighters are available at each time step. This problem is proved NP-complete even on trees of degree at most three and budget one (Finbow et al.,2007) and on trees of bounded degree b+3 for any fixed budget b>=2 (Bazgan et al.,2012). In this paper, we provide further insight into the complexity landscape of the problem by showing that the pathwidth and the maximum degree of the input graph govern its complexity. More precisely, we first prove that the problem is NP-complete even on trees of pathwidth at most three for any fixed budget b>=1. We then show that the problem turns out to be fixed parameter-tractable with respect to the combined parameter "pathwidth" and "maximum degree" of the input graph

Designing cost-sharing methods for Bayesian games

We study the design of cost-sharing protocols for two fundamental resource allocation problems, the Set Cover and the Steiner Tree Problem, under environments of incomplete information (Bayesian model). Our objective is to design protocols where the worst-case Bayesian Nash equilibria, have low cost, i.e. the Bayesian Price of Anarchy (PoA) is minimized. Although budget balance is a very natural requirement, it puts considerable restrictions on the design space, resulting in high PoA. We propose an alternative, relaxed requirement called budget balance in the equilibrium (BBiE).We show an interesting connection between algorithms for Oblivious Stochastic optimization problems and cost-sharing design with low PoA. We exploit this connection for both problems and we enforce approximate solutions of the stochastic problem, as Bayesian Nash equilibria, with the same guarantees on the PoA. More interestingly, we show how to obtain the same bounds on the PoA, by using anonymous posted prices which are desirable because they are easy to implement and, as we show, induce dominant strategies for the players

Discrete Convex Functions on Graphs and Their Algorithmic Applications

The present article is an exposition of a theory of discrete convex functions on certain graph structures, developed by the author in recent years. This theory is a spin-off of discrete convex analysis by Murota, and is motivated by combinatorial dualities in multiflow problems and the complexity classification of facility location problems on graphs. We outline the theory and algorithmic applications in combinatorial optimization problems

LNCS

In resource allocation games, selfish players share resources that are needed in order to fulfill their objectives. The cost of using a resource depends on the load on it. In the traditional setting, the players make their choices concurrently and in one-shot. That is, a strategy for a player is a subset of the resources. We introduce and study dynamic resource allocation games. In this setting, the game proceeds in phases. In each phase each player chooses one resource. A scheduler dictates the order in which the players proceed in a phase, possibly scheduling several players to proceed concurrently. The game ends when each player has collected a set of resources that fulfills his objective. The cost for each player then depends on this set as well as on the load on the resources in it – we consider both congestion and cost-sharing games. We argue that the dynamic setting is the suitable setting for many applications in practice. We study the stability of dynamic resource allocation games, where the appropriate notion of stability is that of subgame perfect equilibrium, study the inefficiency incurred due to selfish behavior, and also study problems that are particular to the dynamic setting, like constraints on the order in which resources can be chosen or the problem of finding a scheduler that achieves stability

Alternative proof for the localization of Sinai's walk

We give an alternative proof of the localization of Sinai's random walk in random environment under weaker hypothesis than the ones used by Sinai. Moreover we give estimates that are stronger than the one of Sinai on the localization neighborhood and on the probability for the random walk to stay inside this neighborhood